






How Has Environment Mattered? 
 





Anjali Acharya, Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez, Kirk Hamilton 
Environment Department 
 
Piet Buys, Susmita Dasgupta, Craig Meisner, Kiran Pandey, David Wheeler 











World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3269, April 2004 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, 
even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should 
be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, 





* For valuable comments and suggestions, our thanks to Kristalina Georgieva, Magda 
Lovei, Ken Chomitz, Franck Lecocq and the members of the World Bank's Environment 
Sector Board.  The research summarized in this paper has been jointly supported by the 




















































































































How has environment mattered for the World Bank?  The aggregate figures suggest that 
it has mattered a great deal, since the Bank's total environmental lending has exceeded  
$US 9 billion over the past six years.  In this paper, we use newly-available data to 
address a more precise version of the question:  Across countries and themes, how well 
have the Bank's environmental lending and Analytical and Advisory Activities (AAA)  
matched the incidence of environmental problems?  For our assessment, we extend our 
previous work on local pollution and fragile lands (Buys, et. al., 2003) to consideration of 
global emissions, biodiversity, water resources and institutional development.  We 
construct cross-country problem indicators for each environmental theme, and combine 
them with country risk measures to estimate optimal thematic lending and AAA for each 
country.  Then we compare our estimates with actual lending and AAA to assess the 
match between environmental problems and the Bank's response.   
 
We begin by constructing an overall indicator of environmental problems from our 
thematic indicators.  Using regression analysis, we find a strong relationship between 
countries’ general indicator values and the scale of their environmental borrowing, but a 
relatively weak relationship for AAA.  At the thematic level, we find that problem 
indicators have relatively weak relationships with both lending and AAA.  Adding 
country risk to the analysis, we test an optimal allocation model and find that it is 
consistent with the Bank’s actual lending and AAA since 1998.  We conclude that our 
model’s assignment of lending and AAA to countries reflects the Bank’s actual 
experience with partner countries.  The model’s explanatory power is relatively low, 
however, and when we compare model assignments to actual allocations, we find many 
large discrepancies for countries and environmental themes.  Some gaps may reflect 
activity by other donor institutions, but many others may represent problems with 
efficient implementation of the Bank’s Environment Strategy.  To promote further 
discussion of this issue, we use our optimal allocation model to develop measures of 
lending opportunity by environmental theme for the Bank's partner countries.     3
1.  Introduction 
 
The World Bank has become the world's largest source of financing for 
environmental improvement in developing countries.  During the period 1998 - 2003, the 
Bank lent approximately $US 9.2 billion for environmental purposes in 381 projects.
1  
The scale of this activity indicates that environment has mattered a great deal to the Bank 
and its partner countries.  Until recently, however, data scarcity has prevented a more 
detailed assessment of the Bank's environmental operations.  In this paper, we use newly-
available information to ask how, more precisely, environment has mattered:  Across 
countries and themes, how well has the Bank's allocation of resources for lending and 
Analytical and Advisory Activities (AAA) matched the incidence of environmental 
problems?  The analysis extends our previous work on local pollution and fragile lands 
(Buys, et al., 2003) to consideration of global emissions, biodiversity, water resources 
and institutional development.  We construct a cross-country problem indicator for each 
environmental theme, and assess the match between thematic resource allocation and 
problem incidence.  To assist in promoting a closer match, we also combine our 
environmental indicators with information on country risk to estimate optimal resource 
allocation across countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces our 
environmental indicators, and Section 3 provides a measure of country risk.  Section 4 
describes the Bank's environmental accounting information.  In Section 5, we assess the 
match between country lending and the general scale of countries' environmental 
problems.  Section 6 extends the analysis to thematic lending.  Section 7 introduces our 
                                                           
1 This estimate by the Bank's Environment Department includes environmental components of loans in 
other sectors (e.g., transport, agriculture), as well as loans that are attributed to the environment sector.   4
optimal allocation model, with a brief review of the methodology developed in Buys, et 
al. (2003).  Assuming continuity with the past scale and thematic composition of lending, 
Section 8 uses the model to estimate lending and AAA opportunities by country and 
environmental theme for the period 2004-2009.
2  Section 9 interprets our findings using 
two country cases, and Section 10 provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
2.  Environmental Indicators 
 
Building on prior work by Buys, et al. (2003), we construct country indicators for 
six environmental problems:  greenhouse gas emissions; health damage from air and 
water pollution; the threat of natural resource degradation on fragile lands; threats to 
biodiversity; problems related to water resources; and problems with environmental 
policies and institutions.  All of our indices reflect recent research on the cross-country 
incidence of environmental problems.  
For global greenhouse gas emissions, our indicator is total metric tons of carbon-
equivalent in 2000 from fuel combustion (CO2), land-use change (CO2) and other 
sources (methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC’s), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)).  We draw our emissions 
estimates from the World Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis and Indicators 
database.
3  Our estimate of pollution damage is total DALY (disability-adjusted life year) 
losses from air and water pollution.  We draw our DALY estimates from recent research  
                                                           
2  The supporting database and an accompanying atlas can be downloaded from the Environment 
Department (lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/envext.nsf/41ByDocName/Environment), or from the 
Development Research Group (www.worldbank.org/nipr). 
3  The World Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis and Indicators database is available online at 
http://cait.wri.org.   5
by the World Bank, in collaboration with WHO (Pandey, et al., 2004; Wang, et al., 
2003).   
For natural resource degradation, we base our indicator on recent research that 
identifies the vulnerability of people on fragile lands (i.e., land that is steeply-sloped, 
arid, or covered by natural forest) as a major determinant of rural poverty and natural 
resource degradation in developing countries (World Bank, 2003).  Our indicator, the 
total rural population living on fragile lands, has been constructed from a GIS 
(Geographic Information System) - based spatial overlay of demographic, topographical, 
climatic and natural resource information.   
We have developed our biodiversity threat indicator from a variety of sources.  For 
terrestrial biodiversity, we use a GIS-based spatial overlay of human population with 
critical areas identified by Conservation International (CI), the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF), and Birdlife International (BI).  We also include freshwater lake areas, to 
capture the role of inland aquatic ecosystems.  The World Bank’s Environment Strategy 
focuses on both the threat to biodiversity from human encroachment, and the value of 
biodiversity resources for human populations.  Our indicator for this two-way 
relationship in each country is its total human population in critical biodiversity areas.  
For marine biodiversity, we draw on estimates of reef ecosystems at risk by Bryant, et al. 
(1998).  Summing across all endangered reefs, we use each country's share of the total as 
our index of marine biodiversity threat.  While terrestrial and marine threats are quite 
distinct geographically, we create a composite indicator to match the Bank's thematic  
category (biodiversity conservation).  Since the two indices are weakly correlated (ρ = 
.27), assignment of relative weights has a significant impact on the result.  We assign 
equal weights, because we have no scientific basis for a differentiated weighting scheme.   6
To construct a water-resource indicator, we draw on two sources of information.  
The first is an estimated geographic distribution of excess demand for water resources 
(surface and sub-surface) in Vörösmarty, et al. (2000).  We use GIS to compute the total 
population residing in excess-demand areas identified by this research.  The second 
information source is a database of deaths and injuries from floods maintained by the 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, Université Catholique de 
Louvain).  For each of the Bank's partner countries, we calculate the sum of deaths and 
injuries for all recorded floods since 1960.  In constructing an indicator for flood damage, 
we weight deaths to injuries in the ratio 50:1.  Using equal weights, we combine our 
indicators for demand pressure and floods into a composite indicator of water-related 
problems.
4 
We derive our indicator for environmental policy and institutional problems from 
two sources.  The first is the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) database, which rates environmental policies and institutions on a numerical scale 
of 1 (the lowest) to 6.  For this exercise, we reverse the scaling (1 becomes the highest) 
and normalize the ratings so that countries with the greatest problems score 100.  To 
proxy the scale of the problems confronted by environmental institutions, we compute the 
mean value of our five thematic indicators (global emissions, pollution, natural resource 
degradation, biodiversity threats, water-related problems).
5,6  To assure equal weighting 
                                                           
4  Our index of demand pressure also provides a useful proxy for economic damage from drought 
conditions.   We are indebted to our colleagues in the Bank’s Middle East / North Africa region for this 
observation.  
5  While the CPIA ratings provide useful information for comparing institutional needs, they are not 
sufficient for judging investment priorities because they do not account for differences in the scale of 
environmental problems faced by a country's institutions.  If Brazil and Bhutan receive the same CPIA 
rating, for example, ignoring their scale difference will lead to assignment of identical lending in the 
optimization model.   
6  We recognize that an equal-weighted index is only one of numerous plausible indicators for general 
environmental problems.  In Appendix 2, we develop alternative indices and analyze their association with   7
with the institutional rating, we normalize this mean indicator to the range [0 - 100].  Our 
composite indicator is the product of the normalized environmental index and CPIA 
rating.  
  Table 2.1 illustrates the calculation of the policies and institutions indicator for four 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This indicator (row 8) equals the product of the 
indicator of institutional development problems (row 7) and the indicator of overall 
environmental problems (row 6).  The latter is the average of problem indicator values 
for global emissions, pollution, fragile lands, biodiversity and water resources.  The four 
country cases illustrate the contributions of separate components to the final indicator 
values.  Chad has a low overall environmental indicator (.69) but a very high institutional 
indicator (5), yielding a product of 3.44.  South Africa’s overall environmental indicator 
(4.24) is about six times Chad’s value, but its institutional indicator (2) is much lower 
because its institutions are more highly-developed.   The resulting composite indicator for 
South Africa (8.49) is about 2.5 times Chad’s indicator value (3.44).  Kenya has about the 
same composite indicator value as South Africa (8.35), but the indicator components are 
quite different.  Kenya’s environmental indicator (2.39) is somewhat more than half of 
South Africa’s (4.24), but Kenya’s institutional problem indicator (3.5) is about 1.8 times 
South Africa’s.  As a result, the products of the two indicators are nearly the same for the 
two countries.  Of the four countries, Nigeria has by far the largest composite indicator 
value (25.29) because of the size of its overall environmental indicator (8.43). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the equal-weighted index.  Our results show that correlations among the indicators remain at .95 or higher, 
over a broad range of plausible definitions.   8
Table 2.1 Environmental Policies and Institutions Indicators for Four African Countries 
  
Country 
     
  Chad 
    
  Kenya 
    South 
   Africa      
   
Nigeria 
1  Global Emissions   0.45 1.35 8.43 7.26
2 Pollution    1.09 1.89 1.14 12.92
3  Fragile Lands   0.94 3.27 4.60 12.52
4 Biodiversity  0.53 4.15 2.90 6.67
5 Water  Resources  0.44 1.27 4.15 2.77
6  Overall Environmental Indicator  0.69 2.39 4.24 8.43
7  Institutional Development Problems  5.00 3.50 2.00 3.00
8  Environmental Policies and Institutions 
Indicator  3.44 8.35 8.49 25.29
 
3.  Country Experience with Project Implementation 
The World Bank lends to countries that have highly-varied experiences with 
implementation.  To incorporate this factor, we draw on a database maintained by the 
World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED).  The database rates the 
outcomes of 3,075 World Bank projects implemented in 146 countries since 1990.  OED 
rates projects in eight categories: highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately 
satisfactory, marginally satisfactory, marginally unsatisfactory, moderately 
unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.  We interpret the highest two 
ratings as "successful" for our purposes, and define our country risk indicator as the 
percentage of projects rated successful by OED.  Table 3.1 displays the distribution of 
our results by region.  Although the estimated success rates are generally highest in 
Eastern Europe/Central Asia and lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, countries in all Bank 
regions except South Asia exhibit a wide range of variation.     9
Table 3.1:  Distribution of Country Probabilities 
         of Project Success, by Region 
 
 Region  Min  Median Max 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0 64 100
Middle East, North Africa 0 71 100
South Asia  69 71 100
East Asia, Pacific  33 76 100
Latin American, Caribbean 0 76 100
East Europe, Central Asia    0 83 100
 
4.  Environmental Resource Allocation by the World Bank 
The World Bank's Environment Department has recently completed an accounting 
of environmental lending and AAA in seven thematic categories:  climate change, 
pollution management, land management, biodiversity, water resource management, 
environmental policies and institutions, and other environmental management.  This 
exercise has drawn on recent changes in the Bank's accounting system, which now tracks 
the allocation of funds across both sectors (e.g., environment, infrastructure) and themes 
within sectors (e.g., climate change, pollution management).  The new system identifies 
the environmental components of projects whose sectoral identification is non-
environmental.  For example, transport-related projects often include components that 
promote reduction of vehicular air pollution. 
This paper draws on information for all World Bank projects approved since FY 
1998, and all AAA since FY 2000.  Using the appropriate thematic codes, we calculate 
total Bank lending and AAA by country and environmental theme.  Our five 
environmental indicators and the institutional problem indicator are constructed to match 
the corresponding thematic categories in the project database.  The seventh thematic   10
category (other environmental management) has no direct analog, so we use the mean 
value of the five environmental indicators for our matching exercise.   
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Bank's environmental lending is the 
stability of its thematic allocation over time.
7  As Figure 4.1 shows, annual environmental 
lending declined from around $3.5 billion in FY 1993 to $1.0 billion in FY 2003.  
Despite this sharp change in aggregate lending, the regression results in Table 4.1 suggest 
that thematic shares remained stable:  None exhibits a significant time trend since 1993.   









































                                                           
7  We have not analyzed thematic trends for AAA, since the available time interval is much shorter.   11
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 4.1: Trend Tests for Thematic Shares 
 
  
 Climate  Pollution  Land  Biodiversity
8 Water Policy  Other 
       
Time  0.318 -0.167  0.639  0.074  0.008 -1.071  0.199 
 (0.63)  (0.19)  (1.38)  (0.37)  (0.01) (1.65)       (1.09) 
 
Constant  8.337  33.404 8.529  2.215  20.456  24.930 2.128 
  (2.44)*  (5.54)** (2.72)*  (1.61)  (5.86)**  (5.67)** (1.71) 
 
Obs. 11 11  11  11  11 11    11 
R-squared  0.04 0.00  0.17  0.01  0.00 0.23  0.12 
 
Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses          





Produced by thousands of interactions between the Bank and its partner countries, 
these results suggest very strong continuity in the relative valuation of thematic 
objectives.  We will return to this point in Section 7, which develops a model for the 
optimal allocation of environmental resource allocation by the Bank. 
 
5.  How Has Environment Mattered in the Aggregate?  
 
We begin our assessment by analyzing the match between environmental lending, 
AAA and environmental problems at the country level.  Our overall environmental 
indicator is the mean of the five thematic indicators.
9  We use log values for the analysis 
because the size distributions of country indicators and resource allocations are extremely  
                                                           
8  For biodiversity, our data include only Bank lending.  Grants by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
for biodiversity conservation are not included in this analysis, but the GEF is currently conducting a 
parallel analysis of its own resource allocation. 
9  All indicators are normalized to the range [0-100], so they have equal weight in determining the mean 
indicator.   12
skewed.
10  As the scatter plot in Figure 5.1 suggests, the association between overall 
environmental problems and lending is very strong for those countries that have received 
environmental loans.   
Figure 5.1:  World Bank Environmental Lending vs. 
    Overall Environmental Problems (Log Scale) 
 
In a log-log regression of environmental lending on the overall environmental 
indicator (Table 5.1, column 1), the estimated response elasticity is .70, with an 
associated t-statistic of 10.3 and regression R
2 (adjusted for degrees of freedom) of .53.  
                                                           
10  Conventional regression and correlation analysis assume that variable distributions do not contain 
extreme “outlier” observations, because such outliers can sharply skew the results.  In this case, both 
nominal and per-capita distributions are extremely skewed.  Log measures, on the other hand, have regular, 
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Table 5.1: Determinants of Environmental Lending 
 
 
          Environmental Lending
a         Environmental AAA
b 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log  Overall  Env.  0.700  0.425 0.457 0.305 0.433 0.407 
Indicator  (10.35)**  (5.08)** (4.91)** (2.94)** (3.03)** (2.45)* 
 
Log Bank Non-Env.   0.437  0.402    -0.120  -0.018 
Lending    (5.34)** (4.70)**   (0.68)  (0.09) 
 
Log  Bank  Env.       0.015  0.006 
Lending       (0.22)  (0.08) 
 
Log  OED  Success    1.149 1.071   0.864 0.969 
Probability    (3.35)** (2.97)**   (1.41)  (1.41) 
 
AFR  (Sub-Saharan  Africa)   0.245    0.474 
     (0.97)    (0.72) 
EAP (East Asia, Pacific)    0.367      0.878 
     (1.14)    (1.28) 
ECA (Europe, Central Asia)    0.813      0.388 
     (3.25)**    (0.69) 
MNA (Middle East, N. Africa)   0.714    0.058 
     (2.02)*    (0.08) 
SAR  (South  Asia)     0.459    -0.375 
     (1.21)    (0.47) 
 
Constant
c  3.363  -4.160 -4.015 4.292  1.227  -0.169 
  (31.89)** (2.85)**  (2.64)**  (26.51)** (0.44) (0.05) 
 
Observations  92  91 91 63 59 59 
R-squared  0.54  0.70 0.75 0.12 0.22 0.27 
Adj.  R-Sq.  0.53  0.69 0.72 0.11 0.16 0.14 
 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses           
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
a Limited to countries with environmental lending 
n   Limited to countries with environmental AAA     
c   LCR (Latin America, Caribbean) is the excluded regional dummy variable.           
___________________________________________________________________________  
 
This result suggests that a 1% increase in overall environmental problems is 
associated with a .70% increase in environmental lending.  At the regional level, Figure 
5.2 also suggests a good correspondence between overall environmental problems and 
environmental lending in countries where such lending has occurred.  The relationship is 
very strong in East and South Asia (EAP, SAR), but it is also apparent in the other   14
regions.  However, all regions (particularly AFR and LCR) include countries that have no 
lending, despite significant environmental problems. 
Figure 5.2:  World Bank Environmental Lending by Region 
    vs. Overall Environmental Problems (Log Scale) 
 
The number of such zero-lending cases suggests that the Bank's interaction with 
these countries has been affected by other factors.  We introduce broader considerations 
into our regressions by including the Bank's total country lending and countries' OED 
project success rates, as well as regional differences.  The results in columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 5.1 suggest that the Bank's overall lending relationship with a country and the 
country's project success rate are both significant determinants of environmental lending.  
The results in column 3 also indicate a significant component of environmental lending to 
two regions (ECA, MNA) that is not accounted for by our environmental problem 
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Our results for total Bank lending are uniformly significant at the 99% level, and 
the results for the OED ratings are significant at the 95% level or higher.  The parameter 
estimates suggest that a 1% increase in Bank lending is associated with a .4% increase in 
environmental lending, and a 1% increase in the OED rating is associated with an 
environmental lending increase of about 1%.  Once we control for these two factors, 
environmental problems retain a significant impact on environmental lending at the 99% 
level.  However, the estimated response elasticity drops from .70 to around .45.   
The results for AAA in Figure 5.1 are quite different from the results for lending.  
The association with environmental problems is uniformly significant at the 99% 
confidence level, but we find no significance for environmental lending, non-
environmental lending, the OED success probability, or any regional dummies.  R-
squares for the AAA regressions are much lower than R-squares for lending, suggesting a 
much greater random component in the allocation of AAA resources.   
 
6.  Allocation by Environmental Theme 
 
  From an institutional perspective, our overall results for lending are encouraging 
because they suggest that large, politically-difficult reallocations across countries would 
not generally be necessary to bring country lending into alignment with overall 
environmental problems.  The implications for AAA may be more serious, since our 
results suggest that the association between AAA and environmental problems explains 
only a small component of the cross-country variation in AAA.   
We extend the analysis to the thematic level, by regressing lending and AAA for 
each theme on the associated environmental problem indicator (Table 6.1).  The results 
for lending suggest strong relationships that mirror the overall relationship captured by   16
Table 5.1  For each of the six themes, lending is positively associated with the relevant 
indicator at a very high level of significance.  Estimated elasticities are generally near 
0.5, except for biodiversity (0.3) and policies and institutions (1.2).  However, the low R-
squares suggest that most thematic lending is determined by other factors.  For AAA, the 
results are even weaker.  Regression R-squares are extremely low, and thematic AAA is 
not significantly associated with the relevant thematic indicator in 3 of 6 cases.  We find 
positive, significant associations for climate change, water resources and policies and 
institutions.   
Overall, the relationship between AAA allocations and indicator values appears to 
be nearly random.  Although our results indicate significant relationships between 
lending and environmental problems, the low R-squares also imply considerable scope 
for better matching between needs and resources.  In the following sections, we develop 
and implement a model that we believe can assist in this task. 
 
7.  Optimal Thematic Lending and AAA 
 
Following Buys, et. al (2003), we model the welfare impact of World Bank investments 
as a function of their levels and distributions across countries.  We recognize that the Bank 
must strike a balance between country representation and global welfare maximization in its 
resource allocation decisions.  To reflect this balance, we assume that the Bank's welfare 
function is characterized by unit-elastic substitution across countries.  A unit-elastic (Cobb-
Douglas) function permits tailoring of programs to a country's circumstances, while 
encouraging portfolio diversification through the operation of diminishing returns.  In our 
model, expected welfare gains from Bank investments are related to both the scale of a   17
 
Table 6.1: Regression Results: Thematic Lending, AAA and Environmental Indicators  
 
Environmental Thematic Lending vs. Thematic Indicator Values  
(Limited to Countries with Environmental Lending) 
 




Climate  0.469        
  (2.86)**        
Pollution   0.460       
   (3.30)**       
Land    0.459      
    (3.18)**      
Biodiversity     0.320    
     (3.32)**   
Water       0.553   
       (4.33)**   
Policies        1.214 
        (6.26)** 
 
Constant  -2.519 0.686  -0.572 -2.907  0.115  -0.996 
  (7.51)**  (1.80) (1.53) (10.56)**  (0.30) (3.09)** 
  
Observations 92 92 92 92  92 91 
R-squared  0.08 0.11 0.10 0.11  0.17 0.31 
Adj.  R-Sq.  0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10  0.16 0.30 
 
Environmental Thematic AAA vs. Thematic Index Values  
(Limited to Countries with Environmental AAA) 
 





Climate  0.680       
  (3.18)**       
Pollution   0.297      
   (1.14)      
Land    0.367     
    (1.36)     
Biodiversity     0.144    
     (0.77)   
Water      0.522   
      (2.23)*   
Policies       1.131 
       (3.34)** 
 
Constant  -3.142 -1.454 -2.653 -2.163 -0.379 -1.016 
  (8.05)** (2.87)** (5.98)** (4.68)** (0.74)  (1.80) 
  
Observations  63 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared  0.14 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.15 
Adj.  R-Sq.  0.12 0.00 0.01    0.00 0.06 0.14 
  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       18
 
country's environmental problems and the probability that projects will be successful 
under local conditions.  We assume that the Bank assigns the same opportunity values to 
human life, health and natural resource savings in all of its partner countries.  From these 
assumptions, we derive a simple optimal allocation rule (Buys, 2003):  For a particular 
environmental theme (e.g., pollution, threats to biodiversity), each country's optimal 
share of available lending and AAA resources is proportional to the product of its 
problem scale and the probability of project success. 
Do our assumptions, and the resulting allocation rule, actually reflect the Bank’s 
operational experience?  To check for general consistency, we have estimated cross-
country equations in which the log of the Bank’s environmental lending and AAA are 
regressed on the logs of the overall environmental index and the OED measure of success 
probability (Table 7.1).  Our simple allocation rule implies that the parameters of both 
variables are equal to one.  Using the standard F-test for the lending and AAA equations, 
we find that these parameter values cannot be rejected at the standard significance level 
(5%) in either case.  We conclude that the Bank’s environmental lending and AAA have 
been broadly consistent with our allocation rule.  However,  the high degree of 
unexplained variation in both regressions suggests large gaps between actual and optimal 
allocation in many cases. 
Our model addresses the allocation problem within each environmental theme, but 
it cannot determine thematic allocations from total lending resources.  However, our 
historical results for thematic lending shares (Section 4) have strong significance in this  
context.  The stability of these shares, in the face of sharp changes in total environmental 
lending, suggests a clear pattern of preferences underlying the Bank's many transactions   19
with partner countries.  We accept these overall preferences, and assume that future 
thematic lending shares will be identical to the lending shares for the period 1998 - 2003.    
Table 7.1: Tests of the Cobb-Douglas Allocation Rule:  
Environmental Lending and AAA  
(Standard errors in parentheses)  
         Log        Log 
 Lending  AAA 
 
Log Environmental Problem  1.136  1.265 
Indicator (EPI)  (0.18)**  (0.21)** 
 
Log OED Success Probability (OSP)  2.602  1.143 
 (0.73)**  (0.87) 
 
Constant -9.960  -5.099 
 (3.09)**  (3.67) 
 
Observations 139  139 
R-squared 0.28  0.21 
Adj. R-Squared  0.27  0.20 
 
F [EPI = OSP = 1]  2.65  0.78     
Prob. > F  0.07  0.46 
   
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
_____________________________________________________________ 
We also use the lending shares as guidelines for AAA, since the Bank’s analytical and 
advisory activities are supposed to serve its lending program.  
Table 7.2 presents percent changes associated with movement from actual to 
optimal lending by sector and region.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the overall 
gap between actual and optimal environmental lending is small (+5%), but thematic gaps 
vary from around -40% for climate change and biodiversity to +64% for land.  South 
Asia has a relatively large overall gap (+33%), and thematic gaps ranging from -60% or 
less for biodiversity and climate change to over +180% for land and water resources.  In a 
strongly-contrasting pattern, Latin America and the Caribbean have a relatively large 
overall gap (-26%), with increases for climate change (+127%) and biodiversity (+17%) 
and decreases for land and water resources (-70% and -9%, respectively).  Across   20
regions, moving from actual to optimal lending results in increases for Africa (5%), East 
Asia / Pacific (20%) and South Asia (33%), and decreases for Europe / Central Aisa  
(-57%), Latin America / Caribbean (-26%) and Middle East / North Africa (-19%). 




















AFR  -41 30  64 -44 13 0  -65 5
EAP  23 21  27 90 -14 57  99 20
ECA  -15 -46  -85 -70 -61 -61  -26 -57
LCR  127 -30  -70 17 -9 -40  -16 -26
MNA  * -20  138 * -63 -20  97 -19
SAR  -62 -4  181 -69 212 14 -12 33
Total  0 0  0 0 0 0  0  
 
a  Estimates reflect changes from actual to optimal lending 
* Division by 0 in growth rate calculation 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present % differences for AAA under two assumptions.  Table 7.4 
holds thematic AAA shares constant at their levels for 2000-2003, while Table 7.5 
assumes that thematic AAA shares are equal to thematic lending shares for 1998-2003.  
The differences between the two tables are evident, reflecting the substantial differences 
between thematic shares for lending and AAA in Table 7.3.  Lending shares are higher 
for climate, pollution, land and water, while AAA shares are higher for biodiversity and 
environmental policies and institutions.  The difference for pollution is particularly 
striking (31% of lending vs. 10% of AAA). 
Table 7.3:  Thematic Shares for Lending (1998-2003) and AAA (2000-2003) 
Resource Climate  Pollution Land  Biodiversity  Water  Policies  Other 
Lending  10 31  15 3 23 15  4
AAA 4  10  7 10 19 27  21
 
At the regional level, Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show that the change in assumptions makes 
little difference for allocations.  Whether or not thematic lending shares are used for   21
AAA allocation, the pattern of regional change in AAA is similar to the pattern for 
lending (with the exception of Africa):  Two regions have increases in AAA (East Asia / 
Pacific, South Asia) and four regions have decreases (Africa, Europe / Central Asia, Latin 
America / Caribbean and Middle East / North Africa).  Furthermore, the magnitudes of 
overall regional changes are almost identical in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 (again, Africa 
excepted) 
However, changing thematic shares from the AAA allocation to the lending 
allocation has a large impact on thematic results.  Moving to the lending allocation (Table 
7.5) entails very large increases for three sectors (climate (118%), pollution (198%), land 
(107%) and large decreases for two (biodiversity (-73%), policies and institutions  
(-44%)).  Overall, combining these changes with regional shifts generates much larger 
regional % changes within sectors in Table 7.5 than in Table 7.4.  In some cases, change 
patterns are replicated in the two tables (e.g., large % increases in climate, pollution and 
land for EAP; decreases for all themes except water in ECA).  However, other patterns 
are reversed, particularly for biodiversity, which gets a much larger allocation in Table 
7.4 (10% of total AAA) than in Table 7.5 (3% of total lending).   
Table 7.4: % Differences Between Actual and Optimal AAA 



















AFR  -35 20  -62 -75 -81 146  -56 -52
EAP  171 271  411 222 50 -8  88 61
ECA  -63 -83  -65 -87 2 -66  -71 -68
LCR  473 64  -86 90 13 25  -26 -7
MNA  -5 -59  279 -12 -69 19  -49 -39
SAR  -62 9  2,273 100 366 59  1,313 144
Total 0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0
   22
Table 7.5: % Differences Between Actual and Optimal AAA 




















AFR  42 258  -20 -93 -77 37  -92 -52
EAP  490 1,007  955 -14 76 -49  -67 56
ECA  -20 -48  -28 -97 20 -81  -95 -66
LCR  1,150 388  -70 -49 33 -30  -87 -18
MNA  108 24  684 -76 -63 -34  -91 -37
SAR  -17 224  4,804 -47 448 -11  146 166
Total  118 198  107 -73 18 -44  -83 0
 
Our results also suggest possible differences in the relative magnitudes of thematic 
changes for lending and AAA.  Appendix Table 2 presents results for actual and optimal 
lending and AAA across sectors and regions.  We estimate the relative magnitudes of 
thematic gaps by calculating the absolute values of regional thematic gaps as percentages 
of actual thematic allocations.  For each theme, the sum of absolute-value percentage 
gaps provides an indicator of relative “misallocation”.   Table 7.6 summarizes the results 
for three cases:  lending, AAA (A -- with thematic AAA shares), and AAA (L -- with 
thematic lending shares).  Both nominal and rank correlations suggest that misallocations 
are most closely matched for lending and AAA(A) shares; poorly matched for lending 
and AAA(L); and weakly matched for AAA(A) and AAA(L).  We conclude that 
statements about thematic misallocation are highly sensitive to the comparison standard, 
and general conclusions do not seem appropriate.    23
Table 7.6:  Thematic Misallocation Measures 
Numerical data 
Theme  Lending  AAA (A)  AAA (L)    Lending  AAA(A) 
Climate 45  89 142 AAA(A)  0.67  
Pollution 22  82 239 AAA(L)  -0.32 0.45 
Land  70  127 181    
Biodiversity  68  105 73    
Water  49  83 96    
Policies  38  35 48    
Ranks 
Theme  Lending  AAA (A)  AAA (L)    Lending  AAA(A) 
Climate 4  3 3 AAA(A)  0.89  
Pollution 6  5 1 AAA(L)  -0.09 0.26 
Land  1  1 2    
Biodiversity  2  2 5    
Water  3  4 4    
Policies  5  6 6    
 
 
8.  Future Opportunities for Thematic Lending 
 
To assess future opportunities, we assume that total environmental lending during 
the period 2004-2009 will be identical to lending during 1998-2003 ($9.2 billion).  For 
each country, the optimal share of environmental lending by theme is proportional to the 
product of the country's thematic indicator and its OED success probability.  To calculate 
optimal lending, we multiply each country's optimal thematic share by total thematic 
lending for the period 1998-2003.  Then we add across themes to obtain total optimal 
lending for each country.  Recognizing that the Bank may limit its lending to some 
countries for a variety of reasons, we derive a control factor from lending experience 
during the past six years. Across countries, the maximum ratio of environmental loans to 
total loans was 46%.  As Figure 8.1 shows, most ratios were 10% or less.   24
Figure 8.1: Size Distribution of Ratios: Environment Lending / Total Lending, 1998 - 2003 
 
Setting the maximum ratio at 40%, we identify a country's future environmental 
lending opportunity as the lower of two numbers:  our estimate of total optimal 
environmental lending, or 40% of total lending during 1998 - 2003.  With this control, the 
environmental lending opportunity is our optimal lending estimate for 83% of the 150 
countries in our dataset.  For the others, we use the 40% ratio to keep environmental 
lending within a plausible bound.  Having determined the overall lending opportunity,  
we multiply by our optimal thematic shares to estimate thematic lending opportunities.  
We present the results in Appendix 1, with countries in each region sorted by total 
lending opportunity.  The regional tables display historical lending, as well as future 
opportunities.   
To illustrate, the six Sub-Saharan African countries with the highest 
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Tanzania ($76 m.), Uganda ($38 m.), Mozambique ($35 m.), Congo DR ($32 m.), and 
Madagascar ($30 m.).  Our results suggest that lending opportunities are generally largest 
for pollution management, although sizable opportunities also exist for land management, 
water resource management, and environmental policies and institutions.  The mix of 
opportunities differs substantially by country, reflecting differences in their 
environmental problems.  Other regions exhibit similarly-diverse patterns. 
We summarize our results Table 8.1, which includes all countries with 
environmental lending opportunities of $50 million or more during the period 2004-2009.  
Of the 23 countries listed, 7 are in the East-Asia Pacific Region (EAP), 4 in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LCR), and 3 are in each of the other regions.  If, as we 
assume, AAA priorities should reflect lending priorities, then these same 23 countries 
should also form the core group for AAA during the period 2004-2009.  AAA priorities 
for other countries would reflect the same rank-order as the lending opportunities in 
Appendix 1. 
 
9.  Interpretation of Results: Ethiopia vs. Nigeria 
 
We provide an illustrative interpretation of our results by comparing the cases of 
Ethiopia and Nigeria in Table 9.1.  Both have been among the Bank’s top borrowers in 
Sub-Saharan Africa:  From 1998-2003, Nigeria borrowed $912 million and Ethiopia 
borrowed $1,381 million.  Among the 48 Sub-Saharan countries, Nigeria’s overall 
environmental problem indicator ranks first and Ethiopia’s second.  Both countries are in 
the midrange for the OED project success rate (45% for Nigeria; 65% for Ethiopia).  
After adjusting for success rates, Nigeria’s optimal lending is $144 million and Ethiopia’s 
is $128 million.   26









EAP China  2,904
SAR India  1,405
EAP Indonesia  548
SAR Bangladesh  345
SAR Pakistan  299
LCR Brazil  241
LCR Mexico  186
ECA Russian  Federation  153
AFR Nigeria  144
MNA  Iran (Islamic Republic of)  140
EAP Philippines  138
EAP Vietnam  138
MNA  Egypt, Arab Republic of  138
AFR Ethiopia  128
EAP  Korea, Republic of  103
ECA Turkey  102
ECA Ukraine  99
EAP Thailand  93
LCR Argentina  87
EAP Malaysia  78
AFR Tanzania  76
LCR Peru  56
MNA  Yemen, Republic of  50
 
With this information as background, it is instructive to compare actual total and 
thematic lending.  Ethiopia’s actual lending is in the same range as its optimal lending:  
$159 million.  As Table 9.1 shows, Ethiopia ranks high in all environmental indicator 
categories except climate change.  However, the pattern of thematic lending bears almost 
no relationship to Ethiopia’s thematic rankings in Africa, or to its optimal thematic 
lending.  Climate is the most obviously-divergent category, with optimal lending of $2.1 
million and actual lending of $71.8 million.  Lending amounts for pollution management   27
and land and water resource management are far lower than the optimal levels, while 
lending for policies and institutions is substantially higher.   
Nigeria’s case is even more divergent than Ethiopia’s.  Despite the highest ranking 
in Sub-Saharan Africa for environmental problems and $144 million in optimal lending, 
Nigeria’s actual lending is only $2.5 million.  Two themes – pollution and water resource 
management – have very small loans, and the others none at all.   
Table 9.1  Environmental Indicator and Lending Status of Ethiopia and Nigeria 
        Within Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 Climate Pollution Land Biodiversity  Water  Policies  Overall 
Ethiopia              
Indicator Rank  11 2 3 2 3  2  2
Actual Lending  71.8 31.8 0.0 0.7 5.1  33.4  159.2
Optimal Lending  2.1 57.7 23.2 2.8 18.9  18.9  127.5
              
Nigeria              
Indicator Rank  3 1 1 3 4  1  1
Actual Lending  0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3  0.0  2.5
Optimal Lending  7.4 70.3 29.2 1.9 9.7  20.9  143.6
 
 
9.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have used new environmental and accounting information to 
address four questions about the World Bank's environmental lending:   
(1). Have the Bank's patterns of country environmental lending and AAA reflected cross-
country differences in environmental problems?   
 
Our evidence suggests an affirmative answer for both lending and AAA. At the 
country level, we find a strong association between both environmental lending and AAA 
and the overall severity of environmental problems.  This association remains strong after 
we adjust allocations for project risks.   28
(2).  Within countries, have the Bank's thematic lending and AAA reflected the relative 
incidence of thematic problems?  
 
The evidence here is mixed.  For each of the six themes, lending is positively 
associated with the relevant environmental indicator at a very high level of significance.  
However, the low R-squares for our regressions suggest that most thematic lending is 
determined by other factors.  For AAA, the results are even weaker, suggesting a nearly-
random relationship between risk-adjusted environmental priorities and resource 
allocation. 
(3) If resource allocation is not aligned with problems, how large a change would re-
alignment entail?  
  
All of our results assume that future resources for environmental lending and AAA 
will be equal to resources during the past several years.  If more resources become 
available, it might well be possible to increase lending and AAA for all regions and 
themes.
11  With fixed resources, however, both our lending and AAA results imply 
significant reallocations from ECA and MNA to EAP and SAR.  For AFR, our results 
suggest a modest increase in lending and a significant decrease in AAA.  Both lending 
and AAA results suggest moderate decreases for LCR.  If we adopt lending shares for 
AAA, our results also suggest large increases in AAA for climate change, pollution, and 
management of land and water resources, and substantial decreases for biodiversity and 
environmental policies and institutions.   
                                                           
11  Even if more resources were available, of course, relative optimal allocations would reflect the patterns 
displayed by our fixed-resource allocations.   29
(4) To achieve a good match in the future, how should the Bank identify a desirable 
portfolio of environmental lending in each partner country? 
 
Using our optimal allocation model, we have developed estimates of thematic 
opportunities for the Bank's lending and AAA for the period 2004-2009.  We recognize 
that these estimates (in Appendix 1) can only be suggestive, since the lending process is 
complex and uncertain.  In addition, thematic opportunities in some countries may well 
be captured by other donors.  Nevertheless, the numbers in Appendix 1 reflect an 
important new body of comparative information.  We hope that our opportunity estimates 
will provide useful insights for our colleagues in the Bank, our partner countries, and 
other donor institutions. 
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Environmental Lending Opportunities by Bank Region: 
($US Million) 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 
Latin American and Caribbean (LCR) 
Middle East and North Africa (MNA) 



















Nigeria 3 144 912 144 7 70 29  2 10 21 4
Ethiopia 159 128 1381 128 2 58 23  3 19 19 4
Tanzania 118 76 1144 76 3 21 12  5 12 19 3
Uganda 56 38 1430 38 2 12 11  1 6 5 1
Mozambique 30 35 863 35 1 12 4  2 6 8 2
Democratic Republic 
of the Congo  03 2 9 5 4 3 2 3 1 2 8  12 6 1
Madagascar 48 30 829 30 3 10 4  2 2 8 1
Kenya 12 29 535 29 1 9 7  1 4 6 1
Zimbabwe 47 29 136 29 3 7 8  1 4 6 1
Burkina Faso  27 27 505 27 1 7 9  0 6 4 1
Angola 0 26 88 26 1 14 5  0 1 4 1
Niger 21 26 385 26 0 7 7  0 7 4 1
Ghana 58 23 1112 23 2 7 5  1 4 4 1
Chad 33 22 437 22 1 10 4  0 3 5 1
Cote d'Ivoire  41 22 658 22 3 8 4  1 1 4 1
Senegal 53 22 857 22 1 9 5  0 5 2 1
Eritrea 20 21 397 21 0 4 5  3 4 4 1
Zambia 84 21 884 21 6 7 2  0 1 4 1
Mali 39 20 385 20 1 7 6  0 3 3 1
Malawi 1 13 483 13 1 4 1  0 3 2 0
Benin 0 11 144 11 2 4 2  0 2 2 0
Guinea 13 11 319 11 1 5 3  0 0 1 0
Cameroon 57 9 467 9 1 4 2  0 0 2 0
Mauritania 31 8 279 8 0 4 1  0 2 1 0
Burundi 2 6 209 6 0 1 1  0 1 1 0
Rwanda 7 6 445 6 0 2 2  0 1 1 0
Sierra Leone  0 6 239 6 0 3 1  0 0 1 0
South Africa  0 87 15 6 1 1 1  0 2 1 0
Togo 0 4 111 4 0 1 1  0 1 1 0
Central African 
Republic  02 6 0 20 1 0  0 0 0 0
Djibouti 0 2 91 2 0 0 0  0 0 1 0
Gambia 0 2 99 2 0 1 0  0 0 0 0
Guinea Bissau  0 2 63 2 0 1 0  0 0 0 0
Lesotho 14 2 113 2 0 1 1  0 0 0 0
Comoros 0 1 37 1 0 0 0  0 0 1 0
Congo 0 1 131 1 0 1 0  0 0 0 0
Gabon 0 1 5 1 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Mauritius 7 1 59 1 0 0 0  1 0 1 0
Botswana 0 4 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Cape Verde  4 0 127 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Equatorial Guinea  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Namibia 0 4 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Sao Tome and Principe 0 0 10 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Seychelles 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Somalia 0 7 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Sudan 0 64 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0

















China 2744 2904 8881 2,904 205 1090 468  37 702 310 93
Indonesia 328 548 4958 548 107 104 58  47 38 162 33
Philippines 96 138 1515 138 7 23 6  23 17 51 10
Vietnam 227 138 2505 138 4 48 30  7 16 27 6
Korea, Republic of  0 103 7048 103 22 31 6  0 31 10 4
Thailand 0 93 2080 93 13 25 11  6 16 16 5
Malaysia 0 78 704 78 37 3 7  5 1 19 6
Cambodia 22 27 310 27 5 8 3  1 2 6 1
Papua New Guinea  26 22 195 22 3 2 2  3 0 10 2
Lao People's 
Democratic Republic  15 8 176 8 1 1 2 0 1 2 0
Mongolia 15 6 166 6 1 1 0  0 2 1 0
Solomon Islands  0 6 16 6 0 0 0  1 0 3 1
Samoa 5 1 23 1 0 0 0  1 0 1 0
Tonga 1 1 6 1 0 0 0  0 0 1 0
Vanuatu 0 3 4 1 0 0 0  0 0 1 0
Federated States of 
Micronesia  05 0 00 0 0  0 0 0 0
Fiji 0 22 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Kiribati 0 3 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Marshall Islands  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Myanmar 0 72 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Palau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0





















Federation  208 153 4978 153 47 36 8 1 26 28 7
Turkey 352  102 7779 102 11 49 9 1 15 14 3
Ukraine 62  99 1517 99 20 37 4 0 20 14 3
Poland 259  49 1264 49 13 19 0 0 10 3 2
Uzbekistan 80  37 347 37 4 8 6 1 10 7 1
Kazakhstan 65  31 965 31 6 4 5 0 8 5 1
Romania 46  25 1259 25 5 6 2 0 8 3 1
Bulgaria 94  20 868 20 3 12 1 0 3 2 1
Georgia 40  17 462 17 1 11 1 0 1 2 0
Azerbaijan 36  16 397 16 1 5 2 0 3 3 1
Armenia 25  13 456 13 0 6 1 0 3 2 0
Hungary 21  12 368 12 3 3 1 0 4 1 1
Kyrgyz 
Republic  32 12 276 12 0 2 3 0 5 2 0
Tajikistan 16  12 255 12 0 2 3 0 3 3 0
Yugoslavia 0  9 408 9 2 2 2 0 2 2 0
Belarus 7  7 23 7 3 0 0 0 2 1 0
Republic of 
Moldova 7  6 273 6 0 1 1 0 2 1 0
Slovakia 0  6 206 6 2 0 1 0 1 1 0
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 36  5 627 5 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Albania 22  4 427 4 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
Lithuania 36  4 218 4 1 2 0 0 1 0 0
Croatia 52  3 518 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Estonia 0  2 694 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FYR 
Macedonia  31 2 331 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 19  2 167 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 4  2 25 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus 0  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic  0  13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkmenistan 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





















Brazil 527 241 9073 241 77 35 15 9  37 54 13
Mexico 151 186 7701 186 23 48 21 5  56 25 8
Argentina 58 87 6892 87 12 42 1 0  19 11 3
Peru 39 56 998 56 10 15 7 2  11 10 2
Colombia 102 43 2788 43 8 4 5 2  11 10 2
Chile 0 30 285 30 4 12 1 1  7 4 1
Ecuador 30 24 552 24 4 4 3 1  6 5 1
Venezuela 14 24 157 24 7 1 1 1  8 6 1
Bolivia 8 22 655 22 5 6 3 0  3 4 1
Guatemala 31 13 625 13 2 2 3 1  1 3 1
El Salvador  0 10 307 10 1 2 2 0  3 2 0
Nicaragua 28 10 623 10 3 1 1 1  1 2 1
Dominican Republic  4 9 262 9 1 2 2 1  1 2 1
Honduras 24 9 600 9 1 1 2 1  1 2 0
Panama 34 9 256 9 3 1 1 1  0 2 1
Costa Rica  23 7 50 7 1 1 2 1  1 0 1
Uruguay 14 7 923 7 0 5 0 0  1 0 0
Jamaica 0 5 335 5 0 1 1 1  0 2 0
Paraguay 0 5 49 5 1 2 1 0  0 1 0
Belize 4 4 14 4 1 0 0 1  0 2 0
Guyana 4 3 32 3 1 0 0 0  0 1 0
Grenada 0 1 28 1 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines  119 1 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago  0 1 35 1 1 0 0 0  0 0 0
Antigua and Barbuda  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
Bahamas 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
Barbados 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
Dominica 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
Haiti 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
St. Kitts and Nevis  0 0 33 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
St. Lucia  1 0 24 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
Suriname 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0





















Republic of)  90 140 432 140 18 33 28 1 35 21 5
Egypt, Arab 
Republic of  119 138 804 138 6 56 35 2 16 18 4
Yemen, Republic 
of 142 50 848 50 1 10 13 1 14 10 2
Morocco 36 43 826 43 2 6 11 1 13 8 2
Algeria 74 34 503 34 2 9 8 1 8 4 1
Tunisia 44 15 1058 15 1 3 4 0 4 2 1
Jordan 31 13 677 13 1 3 2 0 4 3 0
Lebanon 13 0 360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Libyan Arab 
J a m a h i r i y a  000 000 0 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O m a n  090 000 0 0 0 0 0
Syrian Arab 
Republic  000 000 0 0 0 0 0
















Opportunity Climate Pollution Land Biodiversity Water 
Env Pol 
& Inst  Other
India 1175 1405 11265 1405 59 482 259 15 376  173 42
Bangladesh 215 345 2994 345 4 32 9 1 246 44 9
Pakistan 102 299 2719 299 10 103 49 0 91  38 8
Sri Lanka  58 37 547 37 2 5 3 1 18  6 1
Nepal 37 27 319 27 5 4 8 1 1  7 1
Bhutan 5 3 36 3 0 0 1 0 1  0 0
Maldives 0 3 18 3 0 0 0 1 0  1 0
Afghanistan 0 0 315 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0
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          APPENDIX  2 
      Actual vs. Optimal Lending and AAA 
 
Table II.1:  Lending ($US ‘000,000) 
 
(a) Actual Lending 
Region  Climate  Pollution  Land  Biodiversity Water  Env Pol & 
Inst 
Other Total 
AFR  115  269  128 50 138 179 103 981
EAP 341  1,123  476 77 962 416  84  3,479
ECA 160  388  365 19 335 250  34  1,552
LCR 72  269  243 26 186 256  45  1,097
MNA 0  153  42 0 261 83  8  547
SAR 212  654  117 67 235 237  70  1,592
Total 900  2,856  1,371 238 2,117 1,420  344  9,248
             
(b) Optimal Lending 
Region  Climate  Pollution  Land  Biodiversity Water  Env Pol & 
Inst 
Other Total 
AFR 68  350  210 28 157 178  36  1,027
EAP 420  1,358  603 146 831 654  168  4,180
ECA 136  212  56 6 132 98  25  665
LCR 165  189  73 30 168 155  38  817
MNA 32  123  100 8 96 66  15  441
SAR 80  625  328 21 733 270  62  2,118
Total 900  2,856  1,371 238 2,117 1,420  344  9,248
(c) Actual Lending => Optimal Lending by Theme 
Changes as % of Actual Thematic Totals 
(Absolute Values) 
Region  Climate  Pollution  Land  Biodiversity Water  Env Pol & 
Inst 
Other Total 
AFR 5  3  6 9 1 0  19  0
EAP 9  8  9 29 6 17  24  8
ECA 3  6  23 6 10 11  3  10
LCR  10  3  12 2 1 7 2 3
MNA  4  1  4 3 8 1 2 1
SAR  15  1  15 19 24 2 2 6
Total  45  22  70 68 49 38 53 28
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Table II.2: AAA (US $’000) 
 
(a) Actual AAA 
Region  Climate  Pollution  Land  Biodiversity Water  Env Pol & 
Inst 
Other Total 
AFR 57  116  315 501 830 155  566  2,540
EAP 85  146  68 203 561 1,522  610  3,196
ECA 201  484  94 202 131 609  593  2,314
LCR 16  46  291 70 150 263  355  1,191
MNA  18  118  15 41 314 119 205 831
SAR 115  230  8 46 159 361  30  949
Total 492  1,141  791 1,063 2,146 3,028  2,359  11,020
             
(b) Optimal AAA 
Region  Climate  Pollution  Land  Biodiversity Water  Env Pol & 
Inst 
Other Total 
AFR 81  417  250 33 187 213  43  1,224
EAP 500  1,618  719 174 990 779  200  4,981
ECA 162  252  67 7 158 116  30  792
LCR 196  225  87 36 200 184  45  974
MNA 38  146  120 10 115 79  18  526
SAR 95  745  391 25 873 321  73  2,524
Total 1,073  3,404  1,634 284 2,523 1,693  410  11,020
(c) Actual AAA => Optimal AAA by Theme 
Changes as % of Actual Thematic Totals 
(Absolute Values) 
Region  Climate  Pollution  Land  Biodiversity Water  Env Pol & 
Inst 
Other Total 
AFR 5  26  8 44 30 2  22  137
EAP 84  129  82 3 20 25  17  360
ECA  8  20  3 18 1 16 24 91
LCR  37  16  26 3 2 3 13 99
MNA 4  2  13 3 9 1  8  41
SAR 4  45  48 2 33 1  2  136
Total 142  239  181 73 96 48  86  866                                                          APPENDIX 3 
Comparative Indicators of Country Environmental Problems 
 
 
In Section 2, we introduce an overall environmental problem indicator that 
combines indices for five themes: global emissions, pollution, natural resource 
degradation, biodiversity threats, and water-related problems.  To assure equal weighting 
in the overall indicator, we normalize each thematic index to the range [0-100] and 
compute the average value of the five indices.  Our indicator is specifically tailored for 
this exercise, because each thematic index matches a category in the World Bank's budget 
tracking system.  However, we recognize that indexing overall environmental problems 
need not be confined to equal-weighted aggregation of the five thematic indices.  In this 
appendix, we assess the generality of our approach by comparing our overall indicator 
with others that are based on different aggregation strategies. 
 
We begin by noting significant differences in the units of measurement for our 
thematic sub-indices.  Three are based on DALY-equivalent losses (air pollution, water 
pollution, flood damage); two on polluting emissions (CO2 from fossil fuel combustion 
and forest clearing); two on population pressure (populations occupying fragile lands and 
water-scarce areas); and two on threatened areas (terrestrial and marine biodiversity).  In 
principle, we would prefer to aggregate across such indicators in common units.  For 
example, our country indicators could tally total health or economic damage, if we had 
plausible factors for estimating the DALY- or economic-loss-equivalents of global 
emissions, population pressure on resources, and territorial biodiversity threats.  
Unfortunately, no broadly-accepted conversion factors exist, and valuation schemes 
based on human health or economic implications are particularly controversial in the 
biodiversity policy community. 
 
We seek the middle ground by aggregating the thematic sub-indices into four 
categories that have common measurement units:  DALY losses from pollution and water 
damage; population pressure on resources; global emissions; and threatened areas that 
have significance for biodiversity.  To produce the four new indices, we add the sub-
indices described in the previous paragraph, with one exception.  Using GIS, we have 
computed the population occupying critical areas for terrestrial biodiversity.  We treat 
this as another measure of population pressure on resources, and add it to our estimates 
for populations occupying fragile lands and water-scarce areas.
12  Since we have no 
reasonable way of computing equivalent populations for marine biodiversity, we retain its 
territorial index (% of worldwide reefs at risk). 
 
We use two versions of the four-component index for comparison with our original 
five-theme index.  First, we normalize each category (DALY losses, population pressure, 
global emissions, marine biodiversity) to the range [0-100] and compute the unweighted 
average.  Second, we develop an index that gives heavy weight (.80) to DALY losses, 
                                                           
12  This approach double- (or triple-) counts populations when they occupy overlapping areas for fragile 
lands, water scarcity, and terrestrial biodiversity.  We believe that multiple-counting provides an 
appropriate indicator for pressure on diverse resources in this context.    41
and relatively small weights to population pressure (.10), global emissions (.05) and 
marine biodiversity (.05).  Without claiming any precise validity for the implicit 
conversion factors, we offer this index as a crude approximation of present and 
discounted future impacts on human health.  In any case, it provides a useful comparator 
with the unweighted average index. 
 
Table A3.1 reports correlations for logs and ranks of the three overall indicators.
13  
We refer to the original (5-theme) and alternative (4-aggregate) indicators as Index 1 and 
Index 2, respectively.  The results indicate that the choice of indicator makes little 
difference in practice:  Both correlations between Index 1 and versions of Index 2 are .95 
or higher, and the correlation of the Index 2 versions is .93.  As Figure A3.1 shows, the 




Table A3.1:  Correlations Among General Environmental Indicators 
 
Rank Correlations (150 observations) 
 
                Index 2       Index 2     Index 1 
      (.80 DALY wgt) (Equal Weights) 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
Index 2         1.0000 
(.80 DALY Wgt) 
   
Index 2         0.9262      1.0000 
(Equal Wgts) 
 
Index 1         0.9525      0.9584         1.0000 
 
 
Log Correlations (150 Observations) 
 
                Index 2       Index 2     Index 1 
      (.80 DALY wgt) (Equal Weights) 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
Index 2         1.0000 
(.80 DALY Wgt) 
   
Index 2         0.9314     1.0000 
(Equal Wgts) 
 
Index 1         0.9518     0.9665      1.0000 
 
                                                           
13  Again, we use logs and ranks to compensate for large scaling differences across countries.   42




Since the aggregation strategies for the two indices are so different, there is nothing 
automatic about these correlations.  To show why the relationships are close, Table A3.2 
displays rank and log correlations for the components of Indices 1 and 2.  Associated 
overall indices are identified in parentheses.  For population pressure, the table includes 
both the aggregated component (land, water, terrestrial biodiversity) and separate 
components for the two parts (land,water / terrestrial biodiversity). 
 
Correlations in the first five rows of the tables are all very high, and they are also 
high in the next two rows.  Only in the final row (for marine biodiversity) do low 
correlations appear.  These results explain why the general indicators are so highly 
correlated.  They would remain so unless marine biodiversity were given an extremely 
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       Pollution(1)Land(1) Water(1)DALYs(2)  Pop.(2)  Land(2)   Terr(2)CO2(1,2)  Marine(2)   
                Pressure  Water    Biod.      Biodiversity 
                           Pressure Pressure 
  
Land(1)      0.8923     
Water(1)      0.8715   0.8667     
DALYs(2)      0.8773   0.8551   0.8757     
Pop. Pr (2)   0.9217   0.9491   0.9211   0.8489     
Land,Wat Pr(2) 0.9223   0.9501   0.9608   0.8596   0.9706     
Terr Bio Pr(2) 0.7632   0.8000   0.7078   0.6838   0.8776   0.7689     
CO2 (1,2)  0.6930   0.6268   0.6738   0.5311   0.7455   0.7129   0.6614     
Marine Bio(2)  0.0522   0.1009   0.0750   0.0895   0.1186   0.0663   0.1954   0.0207     1.0000 
 
           Log Correlations 
 
       Pollution(1)Land(1) Water(1)DALYs(2)  Pop.(2)  Land(2)   Terr(2)CO2(1,2)  Marine(2)   
                Pressure   Water    Biod.      Biodiversity 
                           Pressure Pressure     
Land(1)      0.9098     
Water(1)      0.8784   0.8741     
DALYs(2)      0.8539   0.8325   0.8773     
Pop. Pr (2)   0.9316   0.9553   0.9163   0.8298     
Land,Wat Pr(2) 0.9350   0.9618   0.9528   0.8413   0.9735     
Terr Bio Pr(2) 0.7715   0.7912   0.7037   0.6690   0.8721   0.7663     
CO2 (1,2)  0.7415   0.6956   0.7034   0.5613   0.7812   0.7623   0.6681     




In this appendix, we have compared three different indicators for overall 
environmental problems in the World Bank's partner countries.  One indicator is the 
unweighted average of indicators that match the Bank's thematic budget categories for 
environmental lending.  The other two indicators are built from four components that 
reflect natural aggregation opportunities in the thematic subindices.  We create different 
indicators with alternative weighting schemes for these four components:  An unweighted 
average, and an index that gives disproportionate weight to measurable health damage.  
Despite the differences in aggregation strategy and component weighting, we find that 
the three general indices have extremely high correlations.  These reflect very high 
correlations among index subcomponents, with the exception of the index for marine 










































AFR Angola  AGO  0.9068 1.8514 1.4199 0.8278 0.1958 1.1143 1.9500
AFR Benin  BEN  0.8920 0.3945 0.5567 0.3068 0.2539 0.5150 0.6437
AFR Botswana  BWA  0.7224 0.0185 0.1825  0.0071 0.2664 0.2564 0.2564
AFR Burkina  Faso  BFA  0.4535 0.7447 2.1476  0.0000 0.8654 0.9021 1.3531
AFR Burundi  BDI  0.2137 0.2183 0.5033  0.6762 0.3087 0.4113 0.7199
AFR Cameroon  CMR  2.1230 1.3418 1.5295 1.6632 0.1375 1.4556 2.1834
AFR Cape  Verde  CPV  0.0043 0.0110 0.0000  0.0388 0.0031 0.0123 0.0123
AFR  Central African Republic  CAF 0.4247 0.2511 0.3215  0.4100 0.1166 0.3264 0.4897
AFR Chad  TCD  0.4466 1.0883 0.9410 0.5262 0.4398 0.7373 1.8433
AFR Comoros  COM  0.0083 0.0069 0.0756 0.7913 0.0459 0.1988 0.4970
AFR Congo  COG  0.3025 0.6956 0.1684 0.1518 0.0965 0.3031 0.4546
AFR Cote  d'Ivoire  CIV  2.1893 1.1276 1.3575 1.5727 0.3082 1.4042 1.7553
AFR 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo ZAR  7.5195 4.9162 7.5629 5.0101 0.9769 5.5664 8.3497
AFR Djibouti  DJI  0.0363 0.0000 0.0282  0.7986 0.0423 0.1940 0.3394
AFR Equatorial  Guinea  GNQ  0.1162 0.0290 0.0544 0.0443 0.0000 0.0523 0.0914
AFR Eritrea  ERI  0.0127 0.3721 0.9283 4.1296 0.5175 1.2768 1.2768
AFR Ethiopia  ETH  1.4590 7.3725 6.9108 6.9811 3.7517 5.6713 8.5069
AFR Gabon  GAB  0.2191 0.0493 0.0292  0.1151 0.0003 0.0885 0.1327
AFR Gambia  GMB  0.0240 0.1224 0.1142  0.0565 0.0785 0.0848 0.1271
AFR Ghana  GHA  0.9877 0.8018 1.3314  1.9180 0.8172 1.2544 1.5680
AFR Guinea  GIN  0.4055 0.7477 1.0270 0.4917 0.0510 0.5833 0.7291
AFR Guinea  Bissau  GNB  0.0632 0.1484 0.0769 0.0000 0.0489 0.0723 0.1265
AFR Kenya  KEN  1.3463 1.8902 3.2676 4.1531 1.2682 2.5546 4.4705
AFR Lesotho  LSO  0.0605 0.0766 0.2942 0.1442 0.0332 0.1304 0.2282
AFR Liberia  LBR  0.8500 0.1399 0.2548 0.3804 0.0026 0.3487 0.6625
































AFR Malawi  MWI  0.6796 0.6796 0.4505  1.3086 0.7475 0.8281 1.2422
AFR Mali  MLI  0.6978 0.8424 1.6741  0.1123 0.6123 0.8438 1.4766
AFR Mauritania  MRT  0.2840 0.4620 0.2732 0.0159 0.3767 0.3024 0.4536
AFR Mauritius  MUS  0.0797 0.0000 0.0000 1.3827 0.0046 0.3142 0.2357
AFR Mozambique  MOZ  0.5052 1.2749 1.0236  4.7177 0.9549 1.8157 2.7236
AFR Namibia  NAM  0.2630 0.0698 0.2839 0.0324 0.1855 0.1788 0.2235
AFR Niger  NER  0.2723 0.9681 2.3924 0.0020 1.4984 1.0996 1.9243
AFR Nigeria  NGA  7.2621 12.9246 12.5207 6.6690 2.7742 9.0292 13.5438
AFR Rwanda  RWA  0.2318 0.6294 0.9714 0.7958 0.3054 0.6285 0.9427
AFR  Sao Tome and Principe  STP  0.0021 0.0077 0.0063 0.0181 0.0000 0.0073 0.0128
AFR Senegal  SEN  0.4571 0.9345 1.1514 0.0289 0.7917 0.7205 0.9007
AFR Seychelles  SYC  0.0054 0.0005 0.0000  0.5063 0.0002 0.1098 0.1098
AFR Sierra  Leone  SLE  0.3546 0.5836 0.6986  0.6277 0.0004 0.4852 0.8490
AFR Somalia  SOM  0.0000 0.3958 1.8966  1.4769 1.3678 1.1004 1.9532
AFR South  Africa  ZAF  8.4329 1.1370 4.6014 2.8963 4.1524 4.5456 4.5456
AFR Sudan  SDN  2.6443 2.1251 4.6193 2.4044 3.8820 3.3578 5.8762
AFR Swaziland  SWZ  0.0189 0.0272 0.1566  0.0758 0.0210 0.0642 0.1123
AFR Tanzania  TZA  1.5453 2.2307 3.0535 10.1379 1.9286 4.0478 7.0836
AFR Togo  TGO  0.2978 0.3053 0.4052 0.3384 0.2281 0.3373 0.5060
AFR Uganda  UGA  1.3430 1.4216 3.1087  1.3658 1.1344 1.7937 2.2421
AFR Zambia  ZMB  5.1635 1.0184 0.5727  1.1385 0.2946 1.7539 2.1924
AFR Zimbabwe  ZWE  1.6509 0.6603 1.7932 1.2610 0.6551 1.2897 1.9345
EAP Cambodia  KHM  2.5360 0.8494 0.8239 1.5824 0.3849 1.3231 2.3155
EAP China  CHN  100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 66.8254 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000
EAP  Federated States of Micronesia FSM  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  4.2897 0.0000 0.9189 1.3784
EAP Fiji  FJI  0.0587 0.0362 0.0139 12.0801 0.0437 2.6204 3.2754
































EAP Kiribati  KIR  0.0011 0.0040 0.0000 2.4953 0.0000 0.5356 0.9374
EAP  Korea, Republic of  KOR  10.7061 2.8399 1.3485 0.0000 4.5143 4.1576 3.1182
EAP 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic LAO  0.6154 0.1158 0.6993 0.6880 0.1124 0.4779 0.8363
EAP Malaysia  MYS  17.6222 0.3122 1.4990 8.2787 0.1521 5.9689 5.9689
EAP Marshall  Islands  MHL  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.3447 0.0000 0.0738 0.1107
EAP Mongolia  MNG  0.5697 0.1340 0.0968  0.1994 0.2555 0.2689 0.4034
EAP Myanmar  MMR  10.3228 2.7633 2.6054 7.6709 0.7731 5.1701 7.7552
EAP Palau  PLW  0.0050 0.0000 0.0000  0.0012 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000
EAP Papua  New  Guinea  PNG  3.1437 0.2698 0.7470 11.8367 0.1317 3.4550 6.0463
EAP Philippines  PHL  4.5896 2.7102 1.6094 52.0147 3.1286 13.7208 20.5813
EAP Samoa  WSM  0.0035 0.0001 0.0000  0.8342 0.0033 0.1802 0.1802
EAP Solomon  Islands  SLB  0.0120 0.0157 0.0515  4.6634 0.0225 1.0207 2.0414
EAP Thailand  THA  6.2804 2.2475 2.3871 11.1330 2.3248 5.2210 5.2210
EAP Tonga  TON  0.0053 0.0000 0.0000  1.2154 0.0000 0.2615 0.3922
EAP Vanuatu  VUT  0.0182 0.0027 0.0268 5.0536 0.0000 1.0927 1.6391
EAP Vietnam  VNM  1.6227 4.0098 5.8763 11.4812 2.0257 5.3587 8.0380
ECA Albania  ALB  0.0905 0.0509 0.2400  0.2847 0.1110 0.1665 0.2497
ECA Armenia  ARM  0.1365 0.5736 0.2579  0.4220 0.3758 0.3783 0.5674
ECA Azerbaijan  AZE  0.8608 0.6782 0.6247  0.9665 0.6502 0.8098 1.2147
ECA Belarus  BLR  1.9358 0.0000 0.0472  0.0000 0.4688 0.5252 0.6565
ECA Bosnia-Herzegovina  BIH  0.3419 0.1305 0.2452 0.0677 0.0116 0.1707 0.2561
ECA Bulgaria  BGR  1.4503 1.2728 0.1400  0.2785 0.5259 0.7856 0.5892
ECA Croatia  HRV  0.5351 0.0878 0.1596 0.0679 0.1014 0.2039 0.2039
ECA Cyprus  CYP  0.1639 0.0638 0.0925  0.0964 0.0518 0.1003 0.1103
ECA Czech  Republic  CZE  2.9150 0.1034 0.0537 0.0935 0.3513 0.7534 0.3767
































ECA FYR  Macedonia  MKD  0.2276 0.0496 0.0911 0.2205 0.0894 0.1453 0.1816
ECA Georgia  GEO  0.2398 0.9365 0.2670 0.5919 0.0816 0.4534 0.6801
ECA Hungary  HUN  1.6407 0.2670 0.2091 0.0069 0.5181 0.5659 0.2830
ECA Kazakhstan  KAZ  3.2324 0.4406 1.2302 0.3149 1.2614 1.3880 1.7350
ECA Kyrgyz  Republic  KGZ  0.1452 0.1392 0.6936 0.2807 0.6423 0.4072 0.6109
ECA Latvia  LVA  0.2910 0.0671 0.0368  0.0000 0.0563 0.0967 0.0725
ECA Lithuania  LTU  0.4928 0.1825 0.0894 0.0000 0.0972 0.1846 0.1385
ECA Poland  POL  7.5946 2.0360 0.1092  0.5814 1.6791 2.5706 1.2853
ECA  Republic of Moldova  MDA  0.2211 0.1435 0.2303 0.0000 0.4788 0.2300 0.2875
ECA Romania  ROM  2.7288 0.5918 0.5117  0.4035 1.3796 1.2029 1.2029
ECA Russian  Federation  RUS  39.8270 5.7603 2.9763 3.0478 6.3715 12.4207 15.5258
ECA Slovakia  SVK  0.9672 0.0344 0.1945  0.1072 0.1349 0.3081 0.2311
ECA Slovenia  SVN  0.4249 0.0218 0.1060 0.0345 0.0000 0.1258 0.0629
ECA Tajikistan  TJK  0.1675 0.1899 0.8516  0.7056 0.6120 0.5412 1.0825
ECA Turkey  TUR  7.7901 6.2446 2.7470 3.0529 3.0016 4.8918 6.1148
ECA Turkmenistan  TKM  1.2652 0.2611 0.6502 0.4896 0.4865 0.6753 1.1818
ECA Ukraine  UKR  10.6160 3.6682 0.8563 0.0425 3.0862 3.9135 4.8918
ECA Uzbekistan  UZB  3.6756 1.3102 2.4277 2.3394 2.4903 2.6226 3.9340
ECA Yugoslavia  YUG  1.2384 0.2049 0.4120 0.2925 0.2855 0.5213 0.7819
LCR Antigua  and  Barbuda  ATG  0.0274 0.0004 0.0004 0.4371 0.0000 0.0996 0.0000
LCR Argentina  ARG  7.0101 4.5965 0.3398 0.5715 3.1743 3.3615 4.2018
LCR Bahamas  BHS  0.0401 0.0125 0.0051 2.7194 0.0005 0.5950 0.8925
LCR Barbados  BRB  0.0315 0.0008 0.0000 0.1812 0.0002 0.0458 0.0641
LCR Belize  BLZ  0.4600 0.0051 0.0216 1.5018 0.0025 0.4265 0.5331
LCR Bolivia  BOL  2.4935 0.6013 0.6610 0.8849 0.4741 1.0956 1.3695
LCR Brazil  BRA  44.9867 3.8868 3.8518 19.2876 6.2602 16.7671 20.9589
































LCR Colombia  COL  5.4294 0.5506 1.5978 5.1924 2.2811 3.2242 4.8363
LCR Costa  Rica  CRI  0.4533 0.0802 0.3384 2.0355 0.1114 0.6467 0.0000
LCR Dominica  DMA  0.0034 0.0005 0.0010 0.0934 0.0000 0.0211 0.0316
LCR Dominican  Republic  DOM  0.6126 0.2578 0.4910 1.9107 0.2374 0.7518 0.9397
LCR Ecuador  ECU  2.0063 0.3728 0.7706 1.5540 0.9557 1.2123 1.8184
LCR El  Salvador  SLV  0.3301 0.1988 0.3583 0.7571 0.5057 0.4606 0.6908
LCR Grenada  GRD  0.0026 0.0012 0.0084 0.2704 0.0000 0.0605 0.0908
LCR Guatemala  GTM  1.5875 0.2555 1.0514 1.5572 0.1615 0.9882 1.4823
LCR Guyana  GUY  0.7880 0.0118 0.0822 0.0713 0.0085 0.2060 0.3605
LCR Haiti  HTI  0.1912 0.5034 0.7006 1.5807 0.3001 0.7017 1.7544
LCR Honduras  HND  0.6312 0.1479 0.4842 1.5713 0.2343 0.6574 0.9861
LCR Jamaica  JAM  0.3172 0.1018 0.2038 2.4849 0.0349 0.6732 0.8415
LCR Mexico  MEX  12.3518 4.8426 4.8053 10.4601 8.7519 8.8281 8.8281
LCR Nicaragua  NIC  1.3549 0.1403 0.2280 1.3006 0.2074 0.6922 0.8652
LCR Panama  PAN  1.2038 0.0860 0.1807 1.1689 0.0131 0.5682 0.7103
LCR Paraguay  PRY  0.9507 0.2586 0.2160 0.2506 0.1082 0.3822 0.6689
LCR Peru  PER  5.2245 1.5320 1.6687 3.2369 1.6835 2.8588 3.5735
LCR  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  VCT 0.0050 0.0013 0.0106  0.2462 0.0001 0.0564 0.0846
LCR  St. Kitts and Nevis  KNA  0.0021 0.0002 0.0002 0.3209 0.0000 0.0693 0.1039
LCR St.  Lucia  LCA  0.0116 0.0033 0.0067 0.3094 0.0000 0.0709 0.0887
LCR Suriname  SUR  0.0707 0.0164 0.0205 0.0130 0.0000 0.0258 0.0000
LCR  Trinidad and Tobago  TTO  0.4366 0.0081 0.0726 0.1075 0.0002 0.1339 0.1339
LCR Uruguay  URY  0.0224 0.4543 0.0082 0.0325 0.1165 0.1358 0.1358
LCR Venezuela  VEN  7.8181 0.2699 0.4344 2.4978 2.6000 2.9176 4.3764
MNA Algeria  DZA  2.3372 1.6133 3.1651  3.0606 2.2880 2.6700 2.6700
MNA  Egypt, Arab Republic of  EGY  3.6780 6.5512 9.5115  5.1725 2.9807 5.9752 7.4690
































MNA Jordan  JOR  0.4834 0.2803 0.3473 0.4996 0.5860 0.4706 0.8235
MNA Lebanon  LBN  0.3801 0.1799 0.0906 0.4008 0.0000 0.2252 0.3942
MNA  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  LBY 1.1208 0.1070 0.1502  0.4916 0.2596 0.4561 0.0000
MNA Malta  MLT  0.0476 0.0000 0.0098  0.0381 0.0000 0.0204 0.0000
MNA Morocco  MAR  1.2510 0.8229 3.4791 3.1124 2.5847 2.4099 3.6149
MNA Oman  OMN  0.6048 0.2689 0.0895  0.7350 0.2182 0.4105 0.4721
MNA Syrian  Arab  Republic  SYR  1.4361 1.1805 1.9036 0.9732 1.6082 1.5212 0.0000
MNA Tunisia  TUN  0.6931 0.3040 0.9238 0.9416 0.6833 0.7595 0.5697
MNA  Yemen, Republic of  YEM  0.5088 1.1904 3.7265 2.9417 2.6924 2.3692 4.1460
SAR Afghanistan  AFG  0.6179 3.3626 4.2685 0.3472 1.3241 2.1251 5.3127
SAR Bangladesh  BGD  2.2978 3.4078 2.2230 2.8736 41.3357 11.1686 16.7529
SAR Bhutan  BTN  0.0360 0.0362 0.1719 0.2311 0.0823 0.1194 0.1194
SAR India  IND  36.8703 56.9200 71.2473 35.1628 69.0581 57.6787 72.0983
SAR Maldives  MDV  0.0138 0.0085 0.0000 1.7602 0.0000 0.3818 0.3818
SAR Nepal  NPL  3.1384 0.5089 2.1001 2.8099 0.2050 1.8770 2.8155
SAR Pakistan  PAK  6.4731 12.0533 13.3931 0.2538 16.6377 10.4559 15.6839
SAR Sri  Lanka  LKA  1.1579 0.5941 0.9722  3.3988 3.2730 2.0127 2.5159
 
 